A-10 Thunderbotl II Warthog's are credited by the DoD for:
DoD sources credit A-10’s:
Destroying:
- more than 1,000 tanks
- 1,200 artillery pieces
- 2,000 other military vehicles
Confirmed kills include:
- 967 tanks
- 926 artillery pieces
- 1,306 trucks
- 501 armored personnel carriers
- 28 command posts
- Successfully hunted and
destroyed SCUD missiles
- Suppressed enemy air defenses
- Attacked early warning radars
Participating A-10
Units of Desert Storm:
|
Wing |
23 TFW |
354 TFW |
10 TFW |
926 TFG |
602 TACW |
|
Units |
74 TFS
76 TFS |
353 TFS Panthers
355 TFS Falcons |
511 TFS |
706 TFS |
23 TASS |
|
Tail Flash |
EL |
MB |
AR |
NO |
NF |
|
Location |
England AFB, LA |
Myrtle Beach AFB, SC |
RAF Alconbury, UK |
Naval Air Station New Orleans, LA |
Davis Monthan AFB, AZ |
|
Type ACFT |
A-10 |
A-10 |
A-10 |
A-10 |
OA-10 (FAC) |
|
# ACFT |
48 |
48 |
18 |
18 |
12 |
| |
|
|
|
|
|
A-10's lost in combat during Desert
Storm
Most recognizable and feared aircraft:
Interviews with captured Iraqi military personnel underscored the overall effectiveness
of the A-10, a seemingly ubiquitous threat, that delivered its weapons with
deadly accuracy.
According to
an
Iraqi captain captured by American forces on 24 February 1991, the single
most recognizable and feared aircraft at low level was the A-10. Not
only did the actual bombing run of the A-10 evoke terror, but also the
plane's ability to loiter around a target area prior to its attack caused
additional anxiety, since Iraqi soldiers were unsure of the chosen target.
Many
Damages: Approx 70 A-10 aircraft suffered some type of battle damage
during Desert Storm. Many of the damages were undocumented cases of relatively
minor problems. Some were even caused by their own aircraft such as a
bomb lanyard slapping a wing flap, or a bomb fragment flying up and embedding
into it's engine cowling. But most was caused by small arm fire and
surface to air missiles.
We had
put together "Quick Fix" teams to deal with all these damages.
At first we would go out to the revetment the aircraft parked in after
returning from a mission, and give it a quick once over inspection for any
damage. However, with the large number of minor damages we were finding,
this process soon turned into tertiary inspections performed out at EOR
itself, which gave us time to radio ahead for a Quick Fix team to be waiting
for the aircraft to park.
I
remember too many nights out at EOR, waiting in the EOR tent, warming up MRE's
on the light-all engine, and hoping we didn't find too much big damage.
It was an excellent spot to be in to watch Scud missiles as they flew over...
hopefully over that is.
Excerpt from 1993 Report "Gulf War
Air Power Survey", Volume III,
Logistics
and Support,
Washington, D.C.
[Source
Link]
Starting from Page 323
Air
Force Logistics Command deployed forty-two aircraft battle damage repair (ABDR)
teams, a total of 621 personnel, to the
AOR
in the first war-time test of the
ABDR
concept.
The split between active duty and reserve was as shown in Table 30.
Individual teams ranged in size from five to thirty-four personnel; each
team comprised an aeronautical engineer and specialists in engines,
structures, egress systems, electrical systems, guidance and control
systems, and other fields.
The first team, from Warner Robins
AFB
and trained in F-15 repairs, deployed simultaneously with the first F-15
squadron. Additional
ABDR
teams and/or individual personnel deployed as
CENTAF
saw the need. For instance, Logistics Command offered to send additional
teams in late September 1990, but
CENTAF
declined with a request that they remain on-call in the United States.
The deployment experience of the 2951st Combat Logistics Support Squadron
from Sacramento Air Logistics Center is probably indicative of the overall
deployment of ABDR personnel and is illustrated
on Table 31.
Table 30
Aircraft Battle Damage Repair Team Deployment
|
|
Active |
Reserve |
|
Number of Teams |
39 |
3 |
|
Number of Personnel |
54 |
972 |
Table 31
2951 Combat Logistics Support Squadron (CLSS)
Deployment to Desert Shield/Desert Storm

|
Departure Date |
Return Date |
Number of Personnel |
Comments |
|
11 Aug 1990 |
12 Oct 1990 |
4 |
Augment F-15 team |
|
25 Sep 1990 |
19 Mar 1991 |
48 |
2 F-111 teams |
|
9 Oct 1990 |
18 Mar 1991 |
3 |
Augment 406
CLSS
F‑111 team |
|
29 Dec 1990 |
11 Mar 1991 |
23 |
A-10 team |
|
7 Jan 1991 |
14 Mar 1991 |
23 |
A-10 team |
|
16 Jan 1991 |
11 Mar 1991 |
23 |
A-10 team |
|
20 Jan 1991 |
11 Mar 1991 |
23 |
A-10 team |
|
1 Jan 1991 |
12 Mar 1991 |
4 |
Augment 2955
CLSS
F‑15 team |
Note that two of the A-10 teams arrived in
the AOR
as the war was starting.
By various counts, approximately
thirty aircraft sustained battle damage.
A listing of the Air Force battle damage and repair activity, obtained from
the Survivability and Vulnerability Information Analysis Center (SURVIAC),
is in Appendix 8-A to this chapter, and shows overall trends.
Figure 63 shows the number of
ABDR
events by aircraft type.
ABDR
Events by Aircraft Type
Figure 64 summarizes damage
frequency by aircraft area.
Figure 64
Damage Areas
The histogram in Figure 65 characterizes
the time required to repair the battle damage.
Because of the limited number of aircraft sustaining battle damage, it is
probably unwise to use the battle damage repair data as conclusive
evidence of any particular trend. It is instructive, however, to compare
the early expectations of the
ABDR
concept with the experience of Desert Storm. In 1976, the Institute for
Defense Analysis published a report titled The Impact of Battle Damage
on A-10 Availability and Sortie Rate.
The report, citing the success of Vietnam-era rapid area maintenance teams,
recommended the creation of teams specially trained to perform temporary,
field-expedient battle damage repair on A-10 aircraft and is the
report that led to the
ABDR
concept.
Based on a fairly extensive simulation analysis, the study concluded that
“A dramatic saving of time is possible by following the temporary repair
doctrine. . . . ”
Figure 66 compares the repair times presented in the 1976
IDA
report with those of the fifteen A-10 Desert Storm battle damage incidents
on which we were able to obtain repair data. It should be evident that the
Desert Storm A-10
ABDR
experience is consistent with 1976 expectations in the sense that over
fifty percent of the aircraft were returned to service within four hours.
Because of the limited amount of battle damage to other than A-10 aircraft,
the comparison was not extended to other aircraft types.
A result of the limited need for battle
damage repair was that
ABDR
teams and technicians functioned in their traditional combat logistics
support squadron (CLSS)
roles (i.e., performing heavy maintenance) or were simply integrated into
the maintenance organizations where they were stationed. The
ABDR
personnel at Taif are an illustration. Sourced from the 2951st
CLSS,
406th CLSS,
and 2953d CLSS,
the 81st Taif ABDR technicians were integrated
so thoroughly into the Taif maintenance organization that they held the
supervisory positions in the Fabrication Shop, Structural Maintenance Shop,
one of the Aircraft Maintenance Units, and the Electric Shop.